Maker’s Knowledge, between A Priori and A Posteriori (8 of 9)

Central Problem

How can maker’s knowledge—the knowledge enjoyed by an agent who brings about a state of affairs—be characterized according to the classic epistemological distinctions: necessary vs. contingent, analytic vs. synthetic, and a priori vs. a posteriori? The chapter confronts a fundamental gap in mainstream analytic epistemology: while the maker’s knowledge tradition (from Bacon through Vico to Kant) is philosophically significant, it lacks precise grounding in terms of what sort of knowledge is actually involved.

The central tension emerges from recognizing that when Alice moves a chess pawn (e2–e4), her knowledge that the move occurred differs fundamentally from Bob’s (the observer) and Carol’s (who receives the message). Yet traditional epistemology, focused on passive observation and single-agent models, cannot adequately capture this difference. The problem requires distinguishing between: (1) holding the same information (which all three agents do), and (2) having different accounts or justifications for that information (where the maker’s position is unique).

Main Thesis

Floridi argues that maker’s knowledge requires introducing a fourth distinction—informative vs. uninformative—decoupled from the traditional three dichotomies, and adopting a multiagent perspective rather than the monoagent approach inherited from Cartesian epistemology.

Core claims:

1. Same Information, Different Account: The maker (Alice), observer (Bob), and receiver (Carol) hold the same synthetic, contingent information p. The difference lies not in the information itself but in how each agent can account for it.

2. The Ab Anteriori: Between a priori and a posteriori lies a third epistemic position—ab anteriori—knowledge acquired neither before nor after experience, but through experience as interaction. The maker’s knowledge is contingent, synthetic, weakly a priori (ab anteriori), and uninformative to the maker herself.

3. Poiesis and Alethization: For the maker, making s happen (poiesis) and making p about s true (alethization) are two sides of the same coin. Alice is not merely the sender of information but the source of its referent.

4. Multiagent Mapping: A sixteen-cell matrix maps all possible combinations of the four dichotomies, revealing distinct epistemic positions: Classic/Carol (column a/r), Innatist (column n), Kantian synthetic a priori (column l), Kripkean analytic a posteriori (column f), Bob the observer (column q), and Alice the maker (column m).

5. Commutative Diagram: The maker’s knowledge can be represented using category-theoretic commutative diagrams showing how blueprints (backward-fitting models) relate to implemented systems differently from how observational models (forward-fitting) relate to observed systems.

Historical Context

The maker’s knowledge tradition stretches from Plato through Bacon, Hobbes, and Vico to Kant and neo-Kantian philosophy. Bacon’s concept of “vexation of nature” exemplifies the classic position where epistemology assumes passive, message-receiving information gathering—whether in Plato’s cave or before Descartes’ fire.

The Kantian revolution introduced the synthetic a priori (challenging the Classic position), while Kripke’s analysis made room for the analytic a posteriori. Both positions share two assumptions: the truths are informative and a single agent holds them. This monoagent focus explains why the maker’s knowledge tradition remained marginal.

The chapter engages with dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), which models information change through communication but typically lacks explicit treatment of the “source” of messages—senders remain outside the system. This limitation prevents DEL from distinguishing knowledge acquired by observation from knowledge acquired through making.

Nineteenth-century German philosophy of technology criticized Kant for failing to recognize that through technology, agents create and manipulate noumenal objects, not just phenomenal perceptions. When Alice builds an Ikea table, she builds a noumenal something.

Philosophical Lineage

flowchart TD
    Plato --> Bacon
    Bacon --> Hobbes
    Hobbes --> Vico
    Vico --> Kant
    Kant --> Kripke
    Kant --> Floridi
    Kripke --> Floridi
    Aristotle --> Floridi
    Shannon --> Floridi
    Searle --> Floridi

    class Plato,Bacon,Hobbes,Vico,Kant,Kripke,Floridi,Aristotle,Shannon,Searle internal-link;

Key Thinkers

Thinker	Dates	Movement	Main Work	Core Concept
Bacon	1561-1626	Empiricism	Novum Organum	Vexation of nature, maker’s knowledge
Vico	1668-1744	Humanism	Scienza Nuova	Verum factum (truth = made)
Kant	1724-1804	German Idealism	Critique of Pure Reason	Synthetic a priori
Kripke	1940-2022	Analytic Philosophy	Naming and Necessity	Analytic a posteriori, rigid designators
Searle	1932-	Philosophy of Language	Speech Acts	Performatives, institutional facts
Hintikka	1929-2015	Epistemic Logic	Knowledge and Belief	Scandal of deduction

Key Concepts

Concept	Definition	Related to
Ab anteriori	Third epistemic position between a priori and a posteriori; knowledge acquired through experience as interaction, not perception	Floridi, Epistemology
Maker’s knowledge	Knowledge enjoyed by agent who brings about the state of affairs modelled by the proposition	Bacon, Vico
Poiesis	The making of s happen; constructive intervention that determines truth	Aristotle, Constructionism
Alethization	Making p about s true; the truth-making aspect of poiesis	Floridi, Epistemology
Blueprint	Model that backward-fits a system not yet existing but to be designed/created	Floridi, Design
Forward-fitting	Relation where model fits already existing system (observation)	Floridi, Epistemology
Backward-fitting	Relation where blueprint fits system that will exist if implemented (design)	Floridi, Design
Uninformative truth	Truth that tells agent nothing new because already held; redundant message	Floridi, Information Theory
Performative	Speech act where saying makes it so (e.g., “you are fired”)	Searle, Austin
Dynamic epistemic logic	Logic modelling information change through communication	Hintikka, van Ditmarsch

Authors Comparison

Theme	Floridi	Kant	Kripke
Central innovation	Ab anteriori (through experience)	Synthetic a priori (before experience)	Analytic a posteriori (after experience)
Agent model	Multiagent (maker, observer, receiver)	Monoagent (transcendental subject)	Monoagent (ideal knower)
Role of interaction	Constitutive of knowledge	Subordinate to perception	Not thematized
Information	Explicitly decoupled fourth distinction	Implicit in analysis	Implicit in analysis
Noumena	Accessible through making/design	Inaccessible to knowledge	Not central concern
Exemplar	Chess move, sweetened coffee	Mathematical judgments	Water = H₂O, Hesperus = Phosphorus

Influences & Connections

• Predecessors: Floridi ← influenced by ← Bacon, Vico, Kant, Kripke, Aristotle
• Contemporaries: Floridi ↔ dialogue with ↔ van Ditmarsch, Hintikka
• Technical frameworks: Floridi ← borrows from ← Category Theory (commutative diagrams), Dynamic Epistemic Logic
• Opposing views: Floridi ← contrasts with ← Cartesian passive epistemology, monoagent traditions

Summary Formulas

• Floridi: The maker’s knowledge is ab anteriori: contingent, synthetic, weakly a priori, and uninformative—acquired through experience as interaction, not perception, with poiesis and alethization as two sides of the same coin.
• Kant: Synthetic a priori truths are possible because the mind structures experience according to its own forms, yet this analysis remains trapped in a monoagent, perception-based framework.
• Kripke: Analytic a posteriori truths reveal that necessity and apriority are distinct, but the analysis still assumes a single epistemic agent accessing information passively.
• Bacon/Vico: We know best what we make ourselves (verum factum)—the maker’s privileged epistemic access derives from being the source, not merely the observer.

Timeline

Year	Event
1620	Bacon publishes Novum Organum, develops vexation of nature
1725	Vico publishes Scienza Nuova, articulates verum factum principle
1781	Kant publishes Critique of Pure Reason, introduces synthetic a priori
1962	Austin publishes How to Do Things with Words, develops performatives
1969	Hintikka identifies “scandal of deduction” problem
1972	Kripke delivers Naming and Necessity lectures, argues for analytic a posteriori
1989	Searle reformulates performatives in institutional terms
2007	van Ditmarsch et al. publish Dynamic Epistemic Logic
2019	Floridi introduces ab anteriori in The Logic of Information

Notable Quotes

“The maker’s knowledge is ab anteriori knowledge. A contingent, synthetic proposition p about s (the information p) is an ab anteriori truth if and only if it can be known by interacting with s to make p true.” — Floridi

“In the maker’s knowledge case, poiesis (making s happen) and alethization (making p about s true) are two sides of the same coin. Alice is not merely the sender of the information that p, she is the source of the referent of p.” — Floridi

“Scientia est scire per causas.” — Aristotle

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Warning

This annotation was normalised using a large language model and may contain inaccuracies. These texts serve as preliminary study resources rather than exhaustive references.